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Overhaul these exceptional and offensive policies of ours, and see if they stand the test of reason and of the world's growing interdependence and coöperation, or whether they belong to the selfish survivals of political policies which we ought long ago to have outgrown. "If you are prepared for war," says the chief of staff, "you will find that the best guard against war." The best guard against war is the policy which does not invite war—which does not foolishly and groundlessly offend other nations, but makes them our friends and assures them that we are their friend. "Turkey is being defeated," he says, "principally because of her lack of preparation." Would he be glad to see her so well "prepared" that she could crush the Balkan States in their struggle for their rights? Turkey is being defeated not because she ought to have more soldiers, but because she misgoverned her provinces of Macedonia and Albania, and these in the crisis became inevitably and properly her enemies and not her friends, a source of weakness and doom instead of defense and strength. This is the thing for the inheritors and spokesmen of the world's outgrown military régime to remember in this modern world, and the business of generals and admirals and the rest of us—and it would be easy and grateful to name some of the generals and admirals who are as conspicuous as anybody else in declaring it—is to devote ourselves not to the organization of bigger armies and navies, but to the organization of the international justice which will make these gradually unnecessary.

"When a nation becomes large and rich and inert," the chieftain continues, "it is certain of annihilation by other powers," and the intimation is that we are inert because we do not raise our force of regulars from 105,000 to 600,000, build up a great reserve force, and turn our colleges into schools for compulsory military drill. The whole argument is an argument that our Canadian brothers on the north, who devote their energies to industry and useful pursuits, are inert, and that our Venezuelan brethren at the south, who so chronically maintain what Colonel Roosevelt calls "the fighting edge," are alert for the truer progress and the uplift of the world. This gospel is a reminder, which is grateful and reassuring, of the benediction upon the republic in its escape from the conjunction of a Rough Rider President and a Rough Rider commander of its armies.

"Our commercial growth," says the chief of staff, "must be accompanied by military growth." The answer to this mischievous and foolish dictum was effectually given in Boston a month ago by the International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, when unanimously and with the greatest enthusiasm manifested during its memorable session it declared that the world's commercial growth must be accompanied by the banishment of militarism, which, with its enormous burdens, is the chief menace to the industry and trade of the modern interdependent family of nations, and that the commercial leaders of the world must work together to put an end to the atrocities of war and organize the nations for the settlement of their differences by international arbitration and international courts. I think that this greatest commercial organization of the world would impatiently brook the tuition in the conditions of commercial growth now proffered it by our American "chief of staff."

General Wood could not have brought his anachronistic preachment to a poorer place than Harvard University. "I am sorry," he said, "that there is no military instruction here at Harvard College," and he held up for emulation to the young men gathered in the Harvard Union the "many colleges which have compulsory military drill," and are thus fitting themselves for leadership in the supposedly inevitable war to which our offensive policies are calculated to bring us with the foreign nations "cramped" by them. It is the glory of Harvard University that it has contributed more leaders than any other higher institution of learning not only in America, but in the world, to the commanding movement to put a period to "inevitable" wars, and to supplant the war system by the system of international law and reason. It was a great Harvard scholar, Charles Sumner, who said that the greatest service the Springfield arsenal ever rendered this country was in inspiring the lofty verse of Longfellow, a great Harvard professor, upon the impeachment of our civilization presented by the fact that, two millenniums after Christ, we still maintain such arsenals for the storage and manufacture of our chief tools for settling international disputes. To Harvard University, when he died, Charles Sumner left provision for an annual prize for the best dissertation by any Harvard student on the methods by which war can be permanently superseded, the first provision of its kind in human history. William Ladd, Channing, Emerson, Parker, Lowell, Phillips Brooks, Edward Everett Hale, Joseph Choate, and a score of other great names, illustrate Harvard's preëminent service in the true method of settling international differences. To ask the young men of Harvard to join in an effort to increase the machinery for settling international disputes by force when the whole logic of the hour prescribes a decrease of the machinery for their settlement by force commensurate with the growing and already so great increase of the machinery for their settlement by law is an affront indeed. When at last the schools and universities of the world are rising to the high plane of the gospel which for two generations Harvard's leaders have so illustriously taught, she is not herself likely to pay much heed to the efforts of a Rough Rider to start a panic over the chance of a hostile power landing 50,000 troops on the Massachusetts coast and his exhortation that Harvard should start "compulsory military drill."

The International Boycott a Dangerous Weapon.

Remarks at the Geneva Peace Congress.

By James L. Tryon, Ph. D.

I regret to differ with the distinguished writer* who has made the report that is now under discussion, but I must take exceptions both to his statement of fact as to the meaning of the resolution that he has laid before us and as to the principle that he has asked us to approve.

The resolution distinctly embodies the idea of the boycott, and everybody who votes for it will approve it in principle. It is a proposition that I cannot endorse. I feel sure that it will not meet with the general ap-

* Mr. Leon Bollack.

proval of publicists. I fear that if we should pass it, the Congress would lose, as it would deserve to lose, the confidence of the governments of the world.

I take pleasure, however, in acknowledging the merits of the writer's paper. It shows research, the scholarly research for which he is distinguished. It offers a method of procedure. The principle of the boycott is to be in the form of supplementary customs' duties. These are to be applied to a limited extent at first; but when public opinion is sufficiently advanced they are to go beyond the mere experimental stage, and there will be a complete interdict. The boycott would be resorted to as a sanction if a nation should refuse to arbitrate a case or to accept a decision when rendered. It would take the place of the military or the police in enforcing the law.

But even if the boycott were desirable, we have not come to that stage in the development of nations when they will agree to permit themselves to be cited to appear before the Hague Court. When we can require a nation to come before that court, we shall have impliedly, if not expressly, a federation of the world—which is what we all hope will come in time, but which is still remote. Perhaps this federation will use compulsion just as a State may use its police force to assist its courts in carrying out its domestic laws. But the details of the world's future federal system are mere matters of speculation. All we know is that international public opinion, and the consequent fear of international isolation, is the sanction of international law today. We have no international sheriffs or policemen.

The resort to the boycott would be dangerous. It would be bad for the internal life of the State against which it was enforced and bad for the whole family of nations that tried to enforce it. The boycott, if applied alike to exports to and imports from a State, would resemble in effect, though not in method, the non-intercourse acts and the embargo which were tried in the United States during the Napoleonic wars. These together resulted in a derangement of commerce and a state of irritated feeling that nearly caused secession and civil war in the American Union.

The boycott would be a dangerous weapon to put into the hands of the nations in these days when great financial "interests" often control the commercial policies of the foreign offices. The "interests" in one country might, upon pretext that some rival country had refused to arbitrate a doubtful case or accept an unpalatable decision, call for all the States to enforce the boycott upon the commerce of the recalcitrant and so destroy its prosperity. This measure, if adopted, might in some unfortunate moment be used against any of our countries. If, therefore, you would approve something which, if carried into effect, might work injury to the commerce of Antwerp or Hamburg, of Liverpool or Glasgow, of New York or Boston, vote for the principle of this resolution.

Moreover, the measure would be dangerous because, in order to be complete and universal in its effect, it must everywhere be supported by public sentiment. To secure the necessary public sentiment, appeal would have to be made to the people of all nations, and that might mean an appeal not to their sense of respect for law simply, but to their prejudices and passions. Public

opinion once thoroughly inflamed might go far beyond the control of the authorities, and demand a still harsher measure than the interdict. In any case, vindictive feelings might be excited that might last for years and demoralize the family of nations.

The Congress might just as well draw up a resolution approving war as to propose the boycott. If we adopt the proposition, the last state of the case will be worse than the first.

But viewed in the light of history the measure is unnecessary. One of the preceding speakers (Dr. Clark) has intimated that when England was ordered by the Geneva tribunal to pay a large sum of money to America for the damage done by the Alabama and other cruisers, she did so without threat of the police, and that Russia, when found responsible for the damage occasioned by the firing of her fleet upon British seamen in the North Sea, paid promptly the money that was due from her. But we can go back not merely one decade to the North Sea incident, or forty years to the Alabama case, though these together, with the recent Hague decisions, all of which have been accepted without use of force, would be evidence enough that the boycott is unnecessary; but we can point to an unbroken record of accepted decisions for a hundred years, going back to the Jay treaty of 1794. The situation would be quite different if there had been a succession of cases of arbitration in which states had refused to abide by the decrees of arbitral courts. Then it might call for a sanction of force of some other kind than public opinion; but there is hardly a single instance in which an arbitration decree has been rejected, unless it has been followed by agreement for a new arbitration or by diplomatic adjustment.

The demand for the boycott is artificial and imaginary. I propose, therefore, that we gratefully acknowledge the excellence of the report which the distinguished writer has presented, but that we lay his recommendations upon the table.

The Peril of the Air.

By W. Evans Darby, LL. D., Secretary of the Peace Society, London.

(Concluded from November issue.)

THE REMEDY.

The remedy clearly is for the leading powers to come to some understanding between themselves which shall prevent what the Baroness von Suttner very aptly calls "the barbarization of the air." This was the opinion held by a distinguished number of persons in Great Britain, three hundred of whom, early in the present year, signed

A MEMORIAL AGAINST THE USE OF ARMED AIRSHIPS.

"We, the undersigned, protest against the use of aerial vessels in war. We appeal to all governments to foster by every means in their power an international understanding which shall preserve the world from what will add a new hideousness to the present hideousness of warfare.

"Without universal agreement, no single power can stay its hand [*i. e.*, can retard its own action]; every day